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Securities Price Risks and Financial

Derivative Markets
Peter H.Huang*
Abstract: The financial and popular media report almost daily on the
volatility of securities market prices. Yet, many people continue to buy securities to hedge against or speculate on certain risks. People can also buy
or sell derivatives to hedge against or speculate on fluctuations in securities
prices. This Article discusses three regulatory policy implications of utilizing derivatives markets to reallocate the bearing of securities price risks.
First, if there are too few non-redundant derivative markets, a competitive
market equilibrium allocation of securities price risks is typically constrained Pareto inefficient. This financial economic result means that for
typical economies, a regulator can in principle improve social welfare by financial market interventions. Second, introducing some but not enough
non-redundant derivatives markets has indeterminate normative consequences for the allocation of securities price risks. This financial economic
result means that for typical economies, introducing a new derivative market can improve, worsen, or have no effect on the welfare of consumers
and investors. Finally, government regulation might not improve the social
allocation of securities price risks because of informational or political
economy obstacles. This financial economic result means that for typical
economies, the ability of regulatory intervention may be constrained by limited knowledge.

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Thanks to Leontine Chuang, Annelise Riles, and David E. Van Zandt for the invitation to participate in this
Symposium. Thanks to Jennifer Arien, Ken Arrow, Don Brown, Graciela Chichilnisky, Rebecca Huss, Avery Katz, Hillary A. Sale, Myron Scholes, Warren Schwartz, Lynn Stout, HoMou Wu, and audience members of an Olin workshop at the Georgetown University Law
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I. INTRODUCTION
The 21st century ushers in a new millennium with the promise of great
changes and novel opportunities for societies in general and for their derivatives and securities markets in particular. But, as is true with many opportunities, there is also the potential for corresponding dangers.' Repeated
recent declines in financial market prices across the globe remind us once
again that derivative and securities markets are not only volatile, but also
increasingly global in the sense of being linked across national boundaries.
In fact, "[t]here are only a few things in daily life which are regarded as a
better synonym for uncertainty than security prices. '2 An increasing number of people monitor in real-time the performance of asset markets in general and their portfolios in particular. This trend is reflected by the advent
of people that only day trade for their living; the rise and success of financial news channels on television; and the plethora of real-time financial
market quotations on the Internet. Financial markets offer the appeal of
freedom, gambling, education, investing, power, security, spectator or participatory sports, and vicarious or actual pleasure.3
International financial markets challenge our current and historical system of jurisdictional and national-based regulation. 4 A related but distinct
question is whether the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") can
keep up with advances in information technologies.,5 The twin forces of
globalization and technological progress mean that derivative and securities
markets today face risks of tumultuous changes. The precise nature of the
risks that participants in and regulators of these financial markets face in
such a world is the subject of this Article.
Financial markets would be superfluous in a world that did not unfold
over time. 6 In a multi-period world of certainty, investors can shift income
over time by trading in riskless bond markets. This reallocation of wealth is
possible because in such a counterfactual world in which there is no risk of

1 The Chinese

characters for danger and opportunity form the Chinese word for crisis.

2 Ralf Kom & Elke Kom, OPTION PRICING AND PORTFOLIO OPTIMIZATON: MODERN
METHODS OF FINANCIAL MATHEMATICS, ix (2000).

3 See, e.g., Adrian Fumham & Michael Arqyle, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MONEY 136-43
(1998) (describing the emotional underpinnings of money).
4Richard Dale, RISK AND REGULATION IN GLOBAL SECURrTs MARKETS (1996) (arguing

that coordination of international securities regulation will become increasingly crucial); Joseph A. Grundfest, Internationalizationand Regulation ofthe World's Securities Markets, in
REGULATING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: ISSUES AND POLICIES 123, 125 (Frank-

lin R. Edwards & Hugh T. Patrick, eds.) (1992).

5 Joseph A. Grundfest, The Future of United States SecuritiesRegulation in an Age of
Technological Uncertainty, STANFORD LAW AND ECONOMICS OLIN WORKING PAPER No. 210

(Dec. 2000), at http://papers.ssm.com/ paper.tafabstractid=253763.
6 Chi-fu Huang, Time and Uncertainty,presented at the General Equilibrium Theory 40t ,
Anniversary Conference at CORE, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium (June 1993) (on file with the
author) (making this observation).
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any sort, riskless bond markets would suffice for all payoff-relevant investment purposes. The term risk denotes a situation in which a decisionmaker actually knows or believes that she knows the probability distribution of the randomness about which she cares. The view that people not
only can, but also do quantify the randomness they face is exemplified by
modem statistical decision theory.7 A different viewpoint is that people do
not know the probability distribution of the randomness they encounter.
This alternative formulation of randomness is known as Knightian uncertainty and is named after the famous economist, Frank Knight.8 Ardent
supporters of the uncertainty approach to randomness include another famous economist, John Maynard Keynes.9 This Article considers randomness in the form of both risky and uncertain securities prices.
In the real world, there are risks of many sorts. Investors can trade in
securities markets to reallocate their wealth across certain types of these
risks. In a classic seven-page tour-de-force article, the 1972 Nobel Laureate
in economics, Kenneth J. Arrow, clarified the precise nature of the risks that
investors can reallocate by trading in securities markets. 0 While risks are
ubiquitous in life in general and in financial settings in particular, risks can
be classified into at least two categories, namely exogenous risks and endogenous risks."

Exogenous risks are ones that an individual or a society believes lie
beyond its control. Neoclassical economic models consider exogenous
risks to be data or primitive variables that are taken as given. Economists
believe that exogenous risks lie outside the scope of economic systems and
e.g. Leonard Savage, THE FOUNDATIONS
view of modem statistical decision theory).
7 See,

8 Frank

Knight,

RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND

OF STATISTICS (1954)

(providing an over-

PROFIT 233 (1921) (differentiating between

risk and uncertainty).
9 John Maynard Keynes, A TREATISE ON PRoBABiLrry (1921) (advocating the view that
most forms of economic randomness are difficult to quantify precisely); John Maynard
Keynes, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 149-52 (1936)
(stating that long-term investments expectations are not so much rationally formed, but instead based on rather precarious conventions).
'0Kenneth J. Arrow, The Role ofSecurities in the OptimalAllocation ofRisk Bearing, 31
REv. ECON. STuD. 91 (1964).
" See, e.g., Peter J. Hammond, Uncertainty,in THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS, UTILrrY AND PROBABILITY 280, 281 (John Eatwell, et al., eds., 1990) (distin-

guishing between exogenous and endogenous uncertainty); Mordecai Kurz, The KestenStigum Model and the Treatment of Uncertainty in Equilibrium Theory, in ESSAYS ON
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR UNDER UNCERTAIrNY 389, 393-97 (Michael S. Balch, et al., eds.,

1974) (introducing the distinction between exogenous uncertainty and endogenous uncertainty); MORDECAI KuRz, ENDoGENOuS ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS: STUDIES IN THE THEORY
OF RATIONAL BELIEFS (Mordecai Kurz, ed., 1997) (collecting papers on a positive theory of
endogenous uncertainty); Mordecai Kurz & Maurizo Motolese, Endogenous Uncertaintyand
Market Volatility (May 5, 1999), at http:llpapers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfmcfid=226302
&cftoken=28406860&abstract id=159608.
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the predictive and explanatory realm of economic models. Thus, economists treat exogenous risks as fixed and given. Exogenous risks include
variations in consumer tastes and production technologies. Natural weather
is the prototypical type of an exogenous risk in the form of such natural disasters as earthquakes, drought, floods, hurricanes, tidal waves, tornadoes,
tropical storms, and tsunamis.
Endogenous risks are ones that result from the interaction of individual
choices made by consumers, firms, governments, and organizations. Neoclassical applied economists believe that they can forecast or predict endogenous risks. Economists view endogenous risks as the subject of their
inquiry and possibly control. Thus, endogenous risks are the subject of
economic models and are within the predictive and explanatory purview of
economic models. Examples of endogenous risks include the volume of
trade and the degree of liquidity of markets. Market prices are the prototypical type of endogenous risk. Other endogenous risks include those
variables whose values are determined in part by the functioning of markets. Examples of such variables include product quality, product variety,
and the scope of the market. Endogenous price risks correspond to market
volatility that is propagated internally by the functioning of markets themselves.
The decision as to whether one classifies a particular risk as exogenous
or endogenous depends to a large degree on the scope of a particular model
and the level of its analysis. The same risk could be viewed as exogenous
for the purpose of one model, but viewed as endogenous for the purpose of
another model. For example, a model of the U.S. economy may treat foreign interest rates as exogenous risks. But, a model of the global economy
may treat all interest rates as endogenous risks. A classical economic
model of domestic environmental policy may treat global warming or the
destruction of the ozone layer as exogenous catastrophic risks. However, a
more recent economic model of international environmental strategic policy
may treat global climate and atmospheric changes as endogenous catastrophic risks that are induced by the industrial emissions of carbon dioxide, the
burning of fossil fuels to produce energy,
and the global use of chloro12
fluorocarbons for industrial production.
In addition to the above noted flexibility in the classification of exogenous versus endogenous risks, many, if not most, risks contain both exogenous and endogenous components. An example of such a bundled risk is
the harmful effects of cigarette smoking that are due to exogenous genetic
dispositions for the harmful effects of smoking and endogenous choices to
smoke cigarettes. A ubiquitous example of an economic risk that has exogenous and endogenous aspects is that caused by asymmetric or differen12 Graciela Chichilnisky & Geoffrey M. Heal, Global Environmental Risks, 7 . ECON.
PERSp. 65 (1993) (describing the role that financial markets play in hedging weather risks).

SecuritiesPriceRisks

21:589 (2001)
tial information between economic agents. Often, the same underlying economic phenomenon involves moral hazard in the sense of hidden risk attribute or type and adverse selection in the sense of unobservable risk
choice or decision. 3 Thus, in the context of health insurance, for example,
a policyholder may have different actuarial risk probabilities or pre-existing
conditions in addition to making different choices about levels of precaution or amounts of care in terms of exercise or diet.
Exogenous and endogenous risks may differ not only in their sources,
but also in the ability of people to accurately forecast them. Exogenous
risks by definition exist regardless of human efforts in prediction. Exogenous risks have been around as long as nature has and exogenous risks have
not increased in their volatility recently. Finally, human experience over
time has resulted in greater accuracy in predicting exogenous risks than in
the past. We have a large historical sample of data upon which to base the
forecasting of exogenous risks.
Endogenous risks are caused by human choices that in part are the result of human efforts to forecast other humans' choices.14 Endogenous risks
have only been around as long as we have. Endogenous securities price
risks have increased in their volatility in recent years. Moreover, humans
appear to be no better now at forecasting endogenous price risks than before. A type of quantum uncertainty principle may apply to forecasting
market prices in the sense that a residual amount of endogenous risk will
always remain in markets. '5
The conceptual distinction between exogenous and endogenous risks is
analogous to that between an individual's type and that individual's choices
in multi-person interactive decision theory, also known more commonly as
game theory.
The fundamental problem of game theory (for players and game theorists alike) is to predict how players will behave. Thus players face
uncertainty over the endogenous decisions of other players. Incomplete information games are converted into complete, but imperfect information games by introducing the notion of players' types. Thus,
strategic uncertainty over endogenous decisions can often be replaced
See generally, Jean-Jacques Laffont, Th EcONOMIcs OF UNCERTAINTY AND
INFORMATION 153-98 (1989) (providing a survey of adverse selection and moral hazard);
Ines Macho-Stadler & David Perez-Castrillo, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EcoNoMIcs OF
13

INFORMATION
14

37-182 (1997) (same).

Robert K. Merton, The Self-FulfillingProphecy, ANIOCH R V. 193 (1948) (introduc-

ing the notion of self-fulfilling prophecies to describe human forecasts of human behavior
that are true because or despite those forecasts becoming known).
15 Werner Heisenberg, 43 ZErrSCHRiFT FUR PHYSIK 172 (1927), translated in QUANTUM
THEORY AND MEASUREMENT 62 (John Archibald Wheeler & Hubert Zurek, eds.) (1983)
(stating the famous uncertainty principle).
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uncertainty over exogenous parameters describing a
by structural
16
game.
A natural question is thus whether endogenous securities prices can be
reduced to exogenous risks in a similar manner. The rest of this Article addresses this fundamental question.
II. REDUCING ENDOGENOUS SECURITIES PRICE RISKS TO
EXOGENOUS RISKS
Obviously, exogenous risk can be a source for endogenous securities
price risk. For example, the equilibrium stock price of a company that produces, markets, and sells orange juice depends on weather, among other
things. Most neoclassical economic models implicitly view exogenous risk
as the only source of endogenous securities price risk. In other words, endogenous securities price risks are completely resolved once exogenous
risks are completely resolved. In our weather example, once somebody is
able to predict weather and other exogenous risks perfectly, that person will
also be able to perfectly forecast endogenous securities prices. In order for
endogenous securities price risks to be reducible to exogenous risks, investors must be able to compute the competitive market equilibrium values of
securities prices upon knowing the values of all exogenous variables. Such
amazing computational feats require not only that people know the actual
structural equations that describe their economy and can solve for the competitive market equilibrium values of commodity and securities prices, but
also that there is a unique vector of such equilibrium prices.
Arrow's pioneering model of the role that securities markets play in allocating risks involved a number of strong assumptions. First, Arrow assumed that investors face only exogenous risks. Second, Arrow assumed
that a complete set of competitive securities markets exists, where securities
market completeness means that any possible payoff pattern over time and
under alternative future risk scenarios can be achieved by trading in active
securities markets. Third, Arrow hypothesized that each investor maximizes her expected utility where her subjective probability beliefs are represented by a single individual probability measure.17 Fourth, Arrow
postulated that all investors shared common expectations over exogenous
risks and have perfect foresight about spot commodity market prices. 8
H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, Market Equilibrium with Endogenous Price Uncertainty and Options, in MARKETS, INFORMATION, AND UNCERTAINTY: ESSAYS IN EcoNoMIc
THEORY IN HONOR OF KENNETH J. ARROW 100 (Graciela Chichilnisky, ed., 1999).
16 Peter

17 In addition to Knightian uncertainty discussed earlier, there are theoretical and empirical challenges to expected utility theory. See, e.g. CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000) (providing classic articles on prospect theory).
18 A formulation of endogenous uncertainty considers heterogeneous expectations, some
of which are mistaken. See Kurz (1997), supra note 11.

SecuritiesPriceRisks

21:589 (2001)
Fifth, Arrow
supposed that all investors process information in the same
19
manner.
Each of these assumptions greatly simplified Arrow's analysis thus
permitting for a rich, powerful, and tractable model. Arrow formally
proved a result that illustrates how securities markets can economize on the
number of markets that are required to ensure a Pareto efficient allocation
of exogenous risks. Arrow introduced a seminal idea to capture all exogenous risks, namely that of a set of states of the world, also known as states
of the environment, or states of nature. A state of the world is a comprehensive notion that "is a description which is complete for all relevant purposes ... about conditions of production or tastes or anything else, which if
known, would affect individuals' desires to trade" and "completely specifies demand and supply conditions., 20 "[A] state of the world is a description so complete that, if known to be true, would completely define all
endowments and production possibilities." 2' A natural question is whether
equilibrium prices are or can be part of a state of the world.22 The neoclassical formulation of states of the world is depicted in figure 1.

Figure 1: Exogenous Uncertainty
Possible Future States

Arrow showed that a complete set of state-contingent securities markets allows investors to achieve the Pareto efficient outcome that would
prevail under a complete set of contingent commodity markets. Suppose
19See, e.g., Ariel Rubinstein, MODELING BOUNDED RATIONALITY 41-62 (1998) (surveying alternative models of information processing).
20 Kenneth J. Arrow, THE Limrrs OF ORGANIZATION 34 (1974).
21
Kenneth J. Arrow & Frank H. Hahn, GENERAL COMPETrrIvE ANALYSIS 122 (1971).

22 Jacques H. Dreze, The Formulationof Uncertainty: Pric~sand States, in MARKETS,
INFORMATION, AND UNCERTAINTY: ESSAYS IN ECONOMIC THEORY IN HONOR OF KENNETH J.

ARRow, 45, 46, 48 (Graciela Chichilnisky ed., 1999) (asking that question and noting difficulties with answering it coherently).
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that a particular economy has C physically differentiated commodities and
S states of the world. Arrow asked whether an economy is able to achieve
the Pareto efficient outcome that is attainable from S times C contingent
commodity markets with less than that many markets. Arrow mathematically demonstrated that an economy can do so by utilizing only S securities
markets today and C spot commodity markets in the future. Decreasing the
number of required markets from S x C markets to S + C markets is apparently a drastic reduction in the number of markets. Such an economizing
on the number of markets lowers the fixed costs of setting up markets and
the ongoing transaction costs of running active markets. But Arrow's theorem requires that all of the above five hypotheses are true. In particular, Arrow's theorem assumed that all investors possess rational expectations over
the prices that will prevail in a complete system of spot commodity markets
for any particular state.
The progeny of Arrow's approach to exogenous risk include the major
successes of neoclassical financial economics, namely models that explain
how investors can utilize securities markets to reduce if not eliminate some
of the financial risks that everyone faces.Y These models include modem
portfolio theory,24 the capital asset pricing model,2 5 the random walk theor7
of stock prices, 26 the arbitrage pricing theory,2 7 and option pricing theory. 8
All of these models explicitly or implicitly assume that securities markets
are complete and that endogenous financial risks are solely the result of exogenous risks. Nevertheless, unfortunately and ultimately, both of these are
strong and untenable assumptions.
A moment of introspection reveals that although there are many securities markets, there are far fewer securities than there are conceivable states
of the world. It is possible for securities markets to be dynamically complete in the sense that repeated trading of a fixed set of multi-period securi23 Melvin W. Reder, ECONOMICS: THE CULTURE OF A CONTROVERSIAL SCIENCE 197-203

(1999)
24 (discussing the success of financial asset pricing models).
Harry M. Markovitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952) (modeling the choice of an
optimal portfolio for an individual investor).
25 William F. Sharpe, CapitalAsset Prices:A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions ofRisk, 19 J. FIN. 425 (1964); John Lintner, The Valuation ofRisk Assets and the Selection ofRisky Investment in Stock Portfoliosand CapitalBudgets, 47 REV. ECON. & STAT.
13 (1965); Jan Mossin, Equilibrium in Capital Asset Markets, 34 ECONOMETRICA 768

(1966); and Jack L. Treynor, Towards a Theory of Market Value of Risky Assets (unpublished manuscript) (1961) (modeling equilibrium stock market prices).
'6 Burton G. Malkiel, Efficient Markets Hypothesis, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 322 (John Eatwell, et al., eds.) (1987) (describing the random
walk theory of securities prices).
27

Stephen A. Ross, The Arbitrage Theory of CapitalAsset Pricing,13 J. ECON. THEORY

341 (1976) (using arbitrage principles to model asset prices).

28 Fisher Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricingof Options and CorporateLiabilities,81 J.
POL. ECON. 637 (1973); Robert C. Merton, Theory of Rational Option Pricing,4 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 141 (1973) (providing models of pricing options).
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ties generates any set of payoffs across the underlying states. 29 However,
such a theoretical possibility assumes the very strong hypothesis that investors possess rational expectations over the stochastic process that prices of
multi-period securities will follow. In fact, substituting the reconvening of
multi-period securities markets for the number of those markets requires
demanding assumptions on the degree of rationality of expectations over
prices that investors possess. Many investors, especially institutional ones,
exhibit much higher levels of rationality than are true of the apocryphal
widows and orphans that SEC regulations and rules are purportedly designed to protect. Institutional investors can increasingly make their financial decisions with the aid of artificial intelligence, nonlinear chaotic
models, genetic algorithms, neural network time series forecasting, and sophisticated quantitative computer valuation models.30 But, even these very
sophisticated investors will have difficulty forming rational expectations
over multi-period stochastic price processes as the number of periods increase. Most investors do not understand or even know the structural equations describing their economy. Even were financial institutions given this
information, they may be unable to compute the values of equilibrium
prices once they correctly deduce the actual state. Instead of being oniscient and unboundedly rational, financial institutions utilize statistical
methods to make the best estimates of their idiosyncratic models of securities prices. The prevalence of unforeseen contingencies is a major reason
why investors will not be able to have perfect foresight. Unforeseen con31
tingencies also explain why real world securities markets are incomplete.
The assumption that securities markets are complete, dynamically or
statically, is thus a counterfactual one. There is a recent literature about incomplete securities markets in the presence of exogenous risks. This financial economic theory is known as the general equilibrium theory of
incomplete securities markets. 32 It is abbreviated by the acronym of GEL
The normative implications of GEI theory are threefold. 33 First, if a suffi29 Darrell Duffle & Chi-Fu Huang, Implementing Arrow-Debreu Equilibria by Continuous Trading of Few Long-Lived Securities, 53 ECONOMErRICA 1337 (1985) (demonstrating
the possibility of dynamically complete securities markets).
30 See, e.g., Paul Wilmott, PAUL WILMoTT ON QUANTITATIVE FINANCE, VOL. 1 & 2

(2000).
31

David M. Kreps, Static Choice in the Presence of Unforeseen Contingencies, in

ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF MARKETS AND GAMEs: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF FRANK HAHN 258

(Partha
Dasgupta, et al. eds., 1992).
32
See, e.g., Darrell Duffle, The Nature ofIncomplete Security Markets, in 2 ADVANCES IN
ECONOMIC THEORY 214 (1992) (presenting a synopsis of the basic GEI models); John D.
Geanakoplos, An Introduction to GeneralEquilibrium with Incomplete Asset Markets, 19 J.
MATH. ECON. 1 (1990) (providing another perspective on GEI); Michael Magill & Martine
Quinzii, THEORY OF INCOMPLETE MARKETS (1996) (offering yet another exposition of GEl).
33 Peter H. Huang, A Normative Analysis ofNew FinanciallyEngineeredDerivatives, 73
S. CAL. L. Rnv. 471,473-74 (2000) (explaining these three policy implications).
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cient number of securities markets are missing, then a GEI is typically associated with a constrained Pareto inefficient allocation of exogenous risks.
Second, introducing some, but not enough distinct securities markets, has
indeterminate normative consequences for the allocation of exogenous
risks. Finally, government regulation might not improve the social allocation of exogenous risks because of informational or political economy obstacles.
Recent advances in theoretical financial economics and the modeling
of bounded rationality extend the neoclassical financial economics paradigm in various directions. This Article considers the policy implications
for the regulation of derivative and securities markets of some of the recent
extensions in financial economic theory involving the phenomenon of endogenous securities price risks and incomplete derivative and securities
markets in the face of such risks. In doing so, this Article parallels a previous article of the author's that provided a detailed exposition of the GEI literature and its regulatory policy implications regarding financial
engineering in the face of exogenous risks. This Article provides an
explanation of the differences and similarities between the ability of
securities markets versus derivative markets to reallocate respectively
exogenous risks versus endogenous securities price risks.
III. IRREDUCIBLE ENDOGENOUS SECURITIES PRICE RISKS
A leading economic theorist stated in her essay that extends the canonical model of neoclassical economics to incorporate endogenous price
risks, "Kenneth Arrow once said that uncertainty about prices may be the
most important form of economic uncertainty. Yet the treatment of uncertainty in Arrow-Debreu markets reflects only nature's moves. It therefore4
neglects price uncertainty, because prices depend on human behavior."
The phrase Arrow-Debreu markets refers to a canonical model of a competitive market economy due to a pair of economics Nobel Laureates, Kenneth J. Arrow (a 1972 recipient) and Gerard Debreu (a 1983 recipient). 5
This model has become the standard benchmark among economic theorists
of what constitutes an excellent model. As another leading economic theorist stated in the introduction to a graduate industrial organization text
which is a standard in that field, "[t]he best-developed and most aesthetically pleasing model in the field of economics
is the competitive36
equilibrium paradigm of Arrow and Debreu.
34 Graciela Chichilnisky, Existence and Optimality of GeneralEquilibriumwith Endogenous Uncertainty, in MARKETS, INFORMATION, AND UNCERTAINTY: ESSAYS IN ECONOMIC
THEORY IN HONOR OF KENNETH J. ARRow 72 (1999).
35 Kenneth J. Arrow & Gerard Debreu, Existence of an Equilibriumfor a Competitive
Economy, 22 ECONOMETRICA 265 (1954) (proving that a competitive equilibrium exists and
is Pareto efficient in a model of a complete system of goods markets under certainty).
36 Jean Tirole, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 6 (1988).
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The Arrow and Debreu paradigm captures the intuition that in a complex economy, everything may depend on everything else.37 The focus of
the Arrow-Debreu model is on demonstrating that a competitive economy
has a general equilibrium vector of market-clearing prices. The phrase general equilibrium ("GE") distinguishes the Arrow-Debreu model from the
partial equilibrium approach that is most often associated with the University of Chicago School of Economics. A GE model consists of a system of
simultaneous equations representing equality of demand and supply for
every market in an economy. A partial equilibrium approach to an issue
just looks at one single market in isolation. The difference between general
versus partial equilibrium analysis is that the former is more complex, while
the latter sometimes might suffice for the purpose of policy formulation.
Nonetheless, in many situations, including the international context, partial
equilibrium approaches will be insufficient, if not misleading for making
policy recommendations. GE theoretical and computational models are the
appropriate tools for understanding markets that are linked across national
boundaries.
The Arrow-Debreu model under uncertainty envisions an economy in
which there is a complete system of contingent goods markets indexed by
time periods and states of the world. Such a model is not now, nor was it
ever, intended to be a realistic description of any economy. Rather, the Arrow-Debreu model is a normative ideal because Arrow and Debreu mathematically demonstrated that under certain technical conditions, a
competitive market economy has a GE and that every such GE is Pareto efficient. This result is known as the first fundamental theorem of welfare
economics. 8 It formalizes the intuition captured in the metaphor, due to
Adam Smith, of an economy whose inhabitants are motivated not by altruism, but as if they were guided
by the invisible hand of self-interest to reach
39
a Pareto efficient allocation.
As this Article pointed out earlier, the formulation of a state of the
world introduced by Arrow is able to capture the phenomena of exogenous
risks, but not endogenous securities price risks. Fortunately, several recent
models in theoretical financial economics deal with endogenous price risks.
One approach to endogenous price risks is based upon the simple, but farreaching observation that competitive market economies typically have a
37 Marilu Hurt McMarty, THE NOBEL LAUREATES: How THE WORLD'S GREATEST
ECONOMIC MINDs SHAPED MODERN THOUGHT 171-74 (2001) (describing general equilib-

rium38models and explaining their significance).
See, e.g. David M. Kreps, A CouRSE IN MICROECONOMic THEORY 199 (1990); Andreu
MasColell, et al., MICROECoNoMIc THEORY 549 (1995); Hal R. Varian, INTERMEDIATE
MICROECONOMIcs: A MODERN APPROACH 522 (5th ed., 1999) (stating and proving alternative formulations of the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics).
39 ADAM SIiTH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES THE WEALTH OF NATIONS

423 (Edwin Cannan ed., reprint, Modem Library 1937) (1776) (stating the metaphor of an
invisible hand).
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multiplicity of GE. Even in the absence of any sort of exogenous risk, a
typical economy will have multiple GE. 40 More precisely, economies that
possess a unique GE are rare in two related but distinct senses. First, randomly perturbing the parameters describing any economy that has just one
GE results in parameters describing another economy with multiple GE.
The standard parameters that describe an economy are the goods and skills
that people are initially endowed with, the tastes that individuals have in
their roles as consumers, and the alternative technologies that producers can
utilize in supplying markets. Second, the parameters that correspond to any
economy with multiple GE have around them an entire neighborhood of
nearby parameter values that also describe other economies with multiple
GE. A property P is said to be true generically if the set of parameters describing an economy for which P is true has the above two properties.
Thus, non-uniqueness of GE is true generically. The intuition for the generic multiplicity of GE is that uniqueness of GE requires very stringent
conditions to be true. An example of such a condition is the4ross substitutability property for the aggregate excess demand function.4 Another example is assuming that the aggregate
excess demand function satisfies the
42
weak axiom of revealed preference.
The multiplicity of GE for typical economies means that even were
people to know and understand the structural equations describing their
economy, they cannot predict which of the multiple GE will come to prevail. In other words, even assuming an amazing degree of rationality,
knowledge, and computational abilities, the non-uniqueness of GE means
that equilibrium securities prices are sources of endogenous risks. Indeterminacy of GE means that it is impossible to reduce all endogenous securities price risks into exogenous risks because even after the state of the
world is known, there remains multiplicity of GE.
The difference between these alternative views of endogenous securities price risks is captured visually by figures 2 and 3. In figure 2, there are
several exogenous states of the world. But, once the state is known or correctly deduced, economic actors are assumed to be able to compute the
unique GE price vector that corresponds to that particular state of the world.
In symbols, s denotes the alternative states of the world. Thus, s lives in the
set S, which consists of all of the mutually exclusive and exhaustive de40 Gerard Debreu, Economies with a Finite Set of Equilibria, 38 ECONOMETRICA 387
(1970) (proving that most economies have multiple competitive equilibria).
41 Timothy J. Kehoe, Uniqueness and Stability, in ELEMENTS OF GENERAL EQuILIBRIUM
ANALYSIS 38, 43-44, 83 (Alan Kirman, ed.) (1998) (noting the restrictive nature of conditions that guarantee uniqueness of GE and explaining the role of the condition of gross substitutes in obtaining uniqueness of GE).
42 MAS-COLELL, supra note 38, at 606-14 (1995) (observing that uniqueness of GE can
be guaranteed only in special cases and explaining how the weak axiom of revealed preference and gross substitutes assumption each imply uniqueness of GE).
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scriptions of payoff relevant exogenous risks.43 This formulation means
that just one value of s will come to pass. Risk in this world means not
knowing ex ante which s will be the one that is realized ex post because the
inhabitants of these models know or can solve for the function that maps
exogenous states of the world into equilibrium price vectors. Let p(s) denote this function. To say that p(s) is a function assumes that there is a
unique GE for every possible state of the world. Thus, the reduction of endogenous securities price risk to exogenous state risk can only occur at the
expense of assuming not only hyper-rationality by investors, but also the
strong conditions that are required to ensure the uniqueness of GE.

Figure 2: Reducible Endogenous
Securities Price Risk
Possible Future Equilibrium Securities Prices

People know the function p(s). So,
.ifthey deduce the state s ex ante or
observe it ex post, they know p(s)

In figure 3, the later heroic uniqueness assumptions are dropped. In
other words, figure 3 maintains the assumption that investors of this fictional world know or can solve for what is known as the equilibrium correspondence P(s) because they know the structural equations of their
economy. 44 Once again, P(s) maps exogenous states of the world into equilibrium securities price vectors. The difference between figure 2 and figure
3 is that investors now realize the mapping P(s) is for typical economies a
genuine multi-valued correspondence and not a single-valued function p(s).
Although both figures 2 and 3 involve endogenous securities price risks, the
difference between them resides in the source of those risks. In figure 2, the
source of endogenous securities price risks is risk over which of the several
exogenous states of the world is likely to materialize. In figure 3, the
source of endogenous securities price risks is risk over multiple GE even after some particular exogenous state of the world materializes. The endoge" The cardinality of S is often assumed to be a finite set for mathematical simplicity, although there are models with a continuum of states of the world.
44

See e.g., Yves Balasko,

(1988).
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nous securities price risk in figure 2 completely disappears once investors
can deduce the actual state of the world ex ante or after they observe the actual state of the world ex post. The endogenous securities price risk in figure 3 persists even if investors can deduce the actual state of the world ex
ante or after they observe the actual state of the world ex post.

Figure 3: Irreducible Endogenous

Securities Price Risk
P(s) is a multi-valued correspondence

Even if people deduce the
stateas ex ante or observe
it ex post, they do not know
the future value of the
correspondence P(s)

p

l

As

A recent financial economic model investigates the role of derivative
markets in the optimal allocation of endogenous securities price risks.an In
particular, that model demonstrated that a complete set of competitive
European option markets
a Pareto-efficient
isermits
allocation of endogenous securities price risks. Such a comforting theoretical result provides a
normative benchmark supporting a laissez-faire regulatory stance towards
an economy with a complete set of European options markets 7 Interestingly, while European options may appear to be redundant assets because
there will be a unique spot market equilibrium, the presence of a set of
complete European options markets is crucial to guard against non-

4
equilibrium expectations about endogenous; securities spot market prices. 1
Thus, European options play a slightly different role in helping investors
cope with endogenous securities price risks than they do in helping inves-

tors deal with exogenous risks.
4-5Huang & Wu, supra, note 16, at 97 (Graciela Chichilnisky, ed.) (1999) (providing such

a model of endogenous securities price risks).

46 Id. at 109-111: Propositions 3 and 4 (proving that a complete set of European options
markets eliminates endogenous price risk. A European as opposed to American option provides its owner with the right to buy or sell an underlying security at some fixed price on
some date as opposed to anytime before that date also.).
47 For a discussion of the notion of completeness whea there is endogenous risk, see id. at
108.
48 Id. at 111 (discussing this phenomenon).

Securities PriceRisks
21:589 (2001)

However, if as is likely the case, European option markets are incomplete, their role must be modified. An economy with incomplete European
option markets will not generate competitive equilibrium allocations that
are Pareto-efficient allocations of endogenous securities price risks. 49 Thus,
a model of incomplete European option markets provides a framework to
study the normative properties of financial innovation and financial engineering to manage endogenous securities price risks. In fact, the GEI of
economies involving endogenous securities price risks have normative consequences that differ from those in the complete markets case.5 As was
true for exogenous risks, GEI are not only Pareto-inefficient, but also constrained Pareto-inefficient. 51 In addition, as was true in the case of exogenous risks, adding European options markets without completing asset
markets has indeterminate normative consequences. Finally as was true in
the case of exogenous risks, the possibility that government intervention
can improve social welfare for typical economies depends on regulators being benevolent and sufficiently knowledgeable.
The notion of endogenous price risks is causing a fundamental rethinking among economists of the neoclassical theoretical financial economic
models that were premised on exogenous risks. 52 This rethinking has the
potential for very far-reaching paradigm-shifting consequences within many
fields of economics, including financial economics and macroeconomics.
Two of the most important endogenous price risks that ordinary people
must cope with are those of inflation and recession. 3 Both of these risks
affect an individual's consumption, investment, and retirement. A similar
rethinking of legal attitudes towards financial innovation and financial engineering involving derivative markets is required because after all a promise of derivative instruments is their potential to hedge against endogenous
price risks of the underlying cash instruments that derivatives are written
upon.

49

Id. at 113 (discussing inefficiency of equilibrium allocations).
-5 Id. at 111-16 (assessing the current state of models involving endogenous securities
price risk for economies with incomplete European options markets).
S An allocation of commodities and securities is Pareto inefficient if there is a reallocation of commodities and securities that makes at least one person better off without making
any other person worse off. An allocation of commodities and securities is constrained Pareto inefficient if there is a reallocation of securities alone that makes at least one person
better off without making any other person worse off.
52 Huang & Wu, supra note 16, at 99-102, and the references that are cited therein.
53

Robert J. Shiller,

MACROMARKETS: CREATING INSTITUTIONS FOR MANAGING

SociETY's LARGEST ECONOMIC RISKS 52, 94 (1993) (documenting the lack of much insurance against recession and inflation).
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
In the presence of endogenous securities price risks, as was true in the
case of exogenous risks, for typical economies, there are new issues raised
by multiplicity of equilibrium prices for underlying spot commodity and securities markets. As with the case for exogenous risks, how effectively
households can utilize competitive European option markets to hedge irreducible underlying endogenous securities price risks depends on whether
such European option markets are complete. With complete European option markets, European options fully insure against underlying price risks.
But, with incomplete European option markets, European options do not
fully insure against underlying price risks and so, they are not redundant assets and cannot be priced by arbitrage.
This article has only scratched the surface in terms of the new concepts, ideas and normative results that endogenous securities price risks offer legal scholars concerned about derivatives.54 Hopefully this article, by
drawing attention to the notion of endogenous securities price risks, will inspire other legal scholars to join in considering the implications of endogenous securities price risks on regulating derivative and securities markets.
Increasingly, the dual forces of globalization and technological change affect financial markets. These developments can result in higher volatility
and greater interdependency of underlying capital markets. That increased
endogenous securities price risk in turn means that derivative markets have
a larger potential role to play in hedging against or speculating upon such
risks.55 Whether that potential is realized depends on whether the regulation of derivative markets is informed by the new advances in financial
economic understanding of endogenous securities price risks.
Hopefully, over time legal scholars, judges, and regulators will incorporate the lessons of recent financial models of endogenous securities price
risks and endogenous non-price risks that extend the well-known models of
exogenous risks from the golden age of neoclassical finance. Although this
article focused on the role of derivatives in hedging against endogenous securities price risks, there are financial economic theoretical models on the
56
role of securities markets in hedging against endogenous non-price risks.
5

4 Id. at 113-16 (discussing a model of endogenous price risks when investors do not have
full structural knowledge of their economy).
" Alessandro Citanna, FinancialInnovation and Price Volatility (Mar. 21, 2000), at

http://papers2.ssm.com/paper.ta.ABSTRACTID=260912 (proving that for sufficiently incomplete securities markets, generically financial innovation can decrease, increase, or have
no effect on price volatility).
56 See, e.g., Graciela Chichilnisky & Geoffrey M. Heal, CatastropheFutures: Financial
Marketsfor Unknown Risks, in MARKETS, INFORMATION AND, UNCERTAINTY: ESSAYS IN
ECONOMIC THEORY IN HONOR OF KENNETH J. ARRow 120 (Graciela Chichilnisky, ed.)

(1999) (providing a model of the role of securities markets in the optimal allocation of endogenous non-price risks).
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In addition, the Chicago Board of Trade introduced in 1994 the trading of
catastrophe futures, whose payoffs depend on the values of annual indices
of insurance claims against such natural disasters as hurricanes or tropical
storms in the United States, as measured by the Insurance Service Organization.57 Catastrophe futures can be combined with contingent insurance or
mutual contracts to form what are known as catastrophe bundles.58
In conclusion, the normative analysis of derivatives when endogenous
securities price risks are irreducible to exogenous risks parallels the normative analysis of derivatives when endogenous securities price risks are reducible to exogenous risks. There are, however, theoretical questions that
remain open when option markets are incomplete for endogenous securities
price risks that are irreducible to exogenous risks. 59 In particular, the incompleteness of European option markets raises the possibility that people
will face uncertainty in the Knightian sense instead of risk over endogenous
securities prices.60

57

Chichilnisky, supra note 12, at 72.

58 See, e.g., Graciela Chichilnisky, CatastropheBundles Can Deal with Unknown Risk, 1
BEST'S REv. (Feb. 1996) (describing catastrophe bundles from an industry perspective).

59 Huang & Wu, supra note 16, at 116 (discussing open theoretical questions in the case
European option markets).
of incomplete
60

id.
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